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Abstract: In the conclusion to the first book of the Treatise, Hume’s
skeptical reflections have plunged him into melancholy. He then proceeds
through a complex series of stages, resulting in renewed interest in phi-
losophy. Interpreters have struggled to explain the connection between
the stages. I argue that Hume’s repeated invocation of the four humors
of ancient and medieval medicine explains the succession, and sheds a
new light on the significance of skepticism. The humoral context not only
reveals that Hume conceives of skepticism primarily as a temperament,
not a philosophical view or system. It also resolves a puzzle about how
Hume can view skepticism as both an illness and a cure. The skepti-
cal temperament can, depending on its degree of predominance, either
contribute to or upset the balance of temperaments required for proper
mental functioning.
1 An overlooked question
In the striking concluding section (1.4.7) of the first book of A Treatise of Human Na-
ture, David Hume pauses his project of “explain[ing] the principles of human nature”1
1A Treatise of Human Nature, Intro.6, SBN xvi. All citations of this text will be marked ‘T,’
followed by the book, part, section, paragraph, and page number of the Selby-Bigge Nidditch edition,
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to survey his findings so far. Doing so fills him with “desponding reflections” about
“the wretched condition, weakness, and disorder” of human cognitive faculties. Since
Hume must use these faculties in his project, “melancholy” and “despair” replace his
normal vigor for it, and “discourage [him] from further enquiries.”2
By the end of the short section, however, Hume finds himself again in an “easy dis-
position” of “good humour.” He feels ready to “contribute a little to the advancement
of knowledge”—to bring his science of man “a little more into fashion.” He invites his
readers to “follow [him] in [his] further speculations” in the Treatise’s latter books.3
Interpreters have placed great weight on this curious transformation. Understand-
ing how Hume emerges from melancholy to again embrace philosophy has seemed to
be the key to Hume’s considered views in the Treatise on the roles of skepticism and
philosophy in human life.4 And so it has seemed crucial to understand the transfor-
mation’s structure and details.
Any complete account of the transformation must note that it is far from immedi-
ate. Hume does not pass directly from his skeptical melancholy to resumed interest in
respectively; ‘A’ is used to refer to Hume’s Advertisement to the Treatise; the text for both is derived
from the Norton & Norton Clarendon Press edition (Hume 1739/2007). Citations of An Enquiry
Concerning Human Understanding are marked ‘EHU’ followed by section and paragraph numbers,
and the page number of the Selby-Bigge Nidditch edition; the text is derived from the Beauchamp
Clarendon Press edition (Hume 1748/2000). Citations of Hume’s Essays, Moral, Political, and Lit-
erary use ‘E’, followed by the standard essay title abbreviations listed on davidhume.org, paragraph
number, and then page number of the Miller edition (Hume 1758/1987). Citations of the History of
England use ‘H’ followed by volume, chapter, and paragraph number; the text is derived from the
Liberty Fund Edition (Hume 1778/1983). Citations of Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion use
‘DNR,’ followed by the section and paragraph number, and then the page number of Kemp Smith’s
edition (Hume 1779/1947). Citations of Dissertation of the Passions and The Natural History of
Religion use ‘DP’ and ‘NHR,’ respectively, followed by the section, paragraph, and page number of
the Beauchamp edition (Hume 1757/2007). Citations of Hume’s letters use ‘HL’, followed by the
letter number given in Greig (1932/2011), and the page number of that edition. When two dates
appear within a citation, the first refers to the first publication of the relevant text, while the second
[in brackets] refers to the publication of the cited version.
2T 1.4.7.1–3, SBN 264–65.
3T 1.4.7.14, SBN 273.
4See Stroud (1991/2011), 144–45; Baier (1991), 1ff; Livingston (1998), 27; Garrett (2002), 206–08;
Harris (2015), 101; Ainslie (2015), 5, 246.
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philosophy. Rather, his transformation involves several distinct stages: After plung-
ing into melancholy (1.4.7.1–8), Hume stops engaging in philosophy to enjoy social
pleasures (1.4.7.9); then feels aggression toward philosophy (1.4.7.10); then composes
his mind through restful activities (1.4.7.12); and finally finds himself curious and
ready to resume his philosophy (1.4.7.12 and 14). The succession can be pictured as
follows:
Hume’s stages in 1.4.7
melancholy → sociability → aggression → composure → curiosity
Why does Hume pass through these several stages, in this order, and no others?
Interpreters often miss the question, despite their interest in Hume’s transformation.
Or rather, many are content to attribute Hume’s passage through these stages to
‘nature’ without further explanation. Barry Stroud, for example, stresses “the nat-
uralness and virtual inevitability of reflecting philosophically.”5 Hume does report
at the end of the process that he is “naturally inclin’d” to reflect and “cannot for-
bear having a curiosity” about philosophical topics.6 But noting the naturalness of
the process does not itself shed light on the significance or order of the stages that
compose it. It does not explain why Hume’s specific progression, as opposed to any
other, is the natural one.
Annette Baier distinguishes several “swings in moods” along the way, noting that
the “transitions” Hume undergoes “are motivated. . . merely by the incompleteness of
the initial mood, its natural fate of supplementation by a successor mood.”7 But she
does not specify in what sense the moods are incomplete or bound to lead to some
specific successor. Similarly, Don Garrett views Hume’s transformation as involving
5Stroud (1991/2011), 155.
6T 1.4.7.12, SBN 270–71.
7Baier (1991), 20–21.
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several shifts of what he calls “moods” or, after Hume, “bents of mind.”8 But he
does not explain why the aggressive mood is, as he puts it, a “natural successor to
philosophical melancholy and delirium.”9 Nor does he explain how it is a natural
precursor to renewed interest in philosophy.
Some interpreters emphasize the role of two passions in Hume’s return to philos-
ophy. When it comes to Hume’s decision “whether he should recommit himself to
philosophy,” Henry Allison writes: “Fortunately for both Hume and us this decision
is made for him by the re-emergence of the inclination to philosophize, fostered by
the passions of curiosity and ambition.”10 On Karl Schafer’s view, “the real founda-
tion of Hume’s rejection of radical skepticism and of his positive epistemology more
generally” is “a distinctively Humean account of epistemic virtue” based in the sat-
isfaction of passions like curiosity.11 According to Donald Ainslie, Hume’s “return to
philosophy is driven primarily by his feelings.”12 But none of these interpreters offers
an account of why these passions arise so prominently when they do. We seem forced
again to point to nature, without understanding its operations.
I think we can say more. First, we can expose and clarify an interpretive question
that has not received due attention. This is the question of why Hume undergoes
the exact succession of stages he does—why he moves from melancholy to sociability,
to aggression, to composure, and finally to curiosity. Second, we can answer the
question. We can explain the significance, order, and completeness of the stages. In




12Ainslie (2015), 225. Ainslie divides 1.4.7 into five parts, but they do not match the five stages
of Hume’s transformation that I have listed. He groups the second and third stages (‘sociability’
and ‘aggression’) under the label “splenetic sentiments,” and then groups the fourth and fifth stages
(‘composure’ and ‘curiosity’) under the relatively uninformative label “the slow return of an incli-
nation to philosophize” (222). I think it is worth distinguishing the stages: in the second, Hume
ignores philosophy, while in the third he is revulsed by it. And in the fourth he composes his mind,
something he must complete before the inclination to philosophize returns in the fifth.
4
doing so, we uncover a striking and unappreciated view of skepticism and its role in
human life.
One important clue is the distinctive language Hume uses when describing the
succession of stages. There, he speaks of “melancholy”13 and “spleen,”14 and makes
frequent allusions to the other “humours”15 of ancient and medieval medicine. In
what follows, I argue that Hume’s repeated invocation of the four humors is the key
to understanding why he portrays himself as moving through the stages he does. For
Hume views his recovery from melancholy as, or as mediated by, a series of shifts in
the temperaments of humoral theory. I call this ‘the humoral reading’ of 1.4.7, and
develop it in §2 below.16
I then consider two natural objections to the reading. §3 addresses what I call
‘the anachronism objection.’ This is the charge that it is anachronistic to claim that
13T 1.4.7.1, SBN 264; 1.4.7.9, SBN 269.
14T 1.4.7.11, SBN 270. See, also, “splenetic” at 1.4.7.10, SBN 269.
15T 1.4.7.10, SBN 269; 1.4.7.11, SBN 270; 1.4.7.14, SBN 273.
16Very few interpreters draw attention to the humoral terms, with most passing them over entirely.
Allison (2008) 319–26, for example, gives a detailed sentence-by-sentence analysis of Hume’s “spleen
and indolence” paragraph (1.4.7.9), without any discussion of its mentions of ‘spleen’ or ‘good
humour.’ Similarly, Fogelin (2009), 6–7, helpfully distinguishes “four contrasting Humes, or at least
four contrasting voices of Hume, inhabiting” 1.4.7, without clearly likening them to the four humors.
A notable exception is Broughton (2005), 189–90 who suggests in passing that “perhaps ‘humors’
are the best term” for describing several of the stages of Hume’s transformation. But she does not
draw out the implications of the humoral language. Nor does she list all the stages or describe any
in detail. Ainslie (2015) goes a step further, interpreting Hume’s appeal to humoral melancholy
as meant to reveal the way in which too much engagement in philosophy can be damaging. He
says: “My suggestion is that Hume deploys the rhetoric of melancholia in [1.4.7] in order to draw
on the idea that it is a condition brought about by excessive study’s interfering with the body’s
proper functioning. For I think that he recognizes that there is something about philosophy itself
that leads it, in particular, to interfere with the proper functioning of the mind” (14). Ainslie only
mentions one humor, however, and, relatedly, ignores the role of the others in reestablishing proper
functioning. As I argue in the text below, Hume conceives of not only the problem but also the
solution in humoral terms. Wicker (2016), esp. 54–57, too, gives a rich reading of 1.4.7 as employing
tropes from medical and cultural discussions of melancholy, but overlooks the role of counterbalance
through opposing humors or temperaments in Hume’s recovery.
Some interpreters invoke the theory of humors and temperaments in connection with Hume’s
letter to an anonymous physician (HL 3) without relating the theory to Hume’s philosophical works.
See Watkins (2018), 11. Others have stressed the influence of physiology and psychology on Hume’s
discussions of skepticism and melancholy in the Treatise without mentioning the humors. See Wright
(1983) and Ievers (2015).
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Hume drew inspiration from an ancient theory of medicine. In response, I argue that
humoral theory not only appears throughout Hume’s own writings and early sources,
but also retained a modest influence over early eighteenth-century Scottish medicine.
§4 addresses what I call ‘the methodology objection.’ This is the charge that the
humoral reading portrays Hume as violating an apparent methodological commitment
to avoid appealing to the bodily causes of mental phenomena. In response, I explain
that Hume makes frequent appeals to human physiology. But I suggest that his
appeals are meant to offer models for thinking about the mind, without thereby
committing him to any one theory of the parts or functions of the body. If that is
right, Hume’s invocations of the humors throughout 1.4.7 suggest that he models his
progression on the four temperaments of humoral psychology, without his needing to
endorse the associated physiology.
In §5, I turn to the humoral reading’s most important philosophical upshots. The
reading, I argue, sheds a new light on the nature and significance of skepticism. On
that reading, 1.4.7 offers a picture of health or proper functioning as a balance of
basic temperaments of mind. The humoral reading, together with other aspects of
Hume’s discussions of skepticism, suggests that, for Hume, skepticism is primarily
a temperament—a temperament which, when balanced with others, produces the
proper doxastic disposition. This conception, I argue, helps to resolve an important
puzzle about Hume’s view of skepticism. The puzzle concerns how Hume can consider
skepticism to be both an illness and a cure. Conceiving of skepticism as a temper-
ament resolves the puzzle, because a temperament can be an illness when overly
predominant, and a cure when moderate. This resolution in turn presents additional
evidence that Hume held such a conception.
Though this conception of skepticism is shaped by humoral theory, it can interest
us even if the theory is false. We do not need to conceive of health as consisting in
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a proper proportion of humors in order to appreciate Hume’s idea that skepticism is
a temperament which, according to its degree of predominance, can both threaten
and restore the mind’s proper functioning. This is a unique and illuminating concep-
tion of the nature, source, and proper treatment of skepticism. On that conception,
skepticism is not a theory as much as a temperament; its familiar and threatening
manifestations do not arise from argument as much as from temperamental excess;
and their proper resolution comes less through counterargument than through coun-
terbalance by other temperaments.
2 A cycle through the humors
According to humoral theory, health requires a balance or proper proportion of four
basic bodily liquids, called ‘humors.’ Disease, both mental and physical, occurs when
one of these humors is overabundant or deficient, either throughout the body or in
one of its parts.17
The theory’s four humors, canonized in the Hippocratic text Nature of Man, are
blood, yellow bile (or choler), black bile (or melancholy), and phlegm.18 Hippocrates
associated each humor with a season and stage of life in which it was thought to be
abundant.19 Over the centuries, the humors took on further associations. Galen of
Pergamon, for example, emphasized that each humor, like each season, was either hot
or cold and either wet or dry, and was thus associated with one of the four elements of
17For canonical expressions of these tenets, see Hippocrates, Nature of Man, Ch. 4 in Jones
(1931), Vol. 4, 10–13; pseudo-Galen, On the Humours in Grant (2000), 16. For short introductions
to humoral theory and its role in aetiology, see Jackson (1969), 368–69; Porter (1987), 39–41.
18See Nature of Man Ch. 4–5 in Jones (1931), Vol. 4, 10–15. These four are not the only humors
acknowledged in the Hippocratic corpus, let alone the whole of Greek medicine. They became
canonical thanks to continued attention to Nature of Man by later medical writers, especially Galen.
See Jones (1931), Vol. 1, xlix–l and Jouanna (2012), 335–38 for discussion.
19Airs Waters Places Ch. 10–11, 13 in Jones (1931), Vol. 1, 98–105 and 108–11; Nature of Man





wet infancy (or all of youth) old age
air (or equal mixture) water
sanguine temperament phlegmatic temperament
= social, hopeful, headstrong = lazy, forgetful, content




bilious (choleric) temperament melancholic temperament
= aggressive, impulsive, bold = gloomy, careful, studious
Figure 1: The four humors sorted as hot or cold, and wet or dry, with associated sea-
son, life stage, element of nature, and temperament. Descriptors of the temperaments
are listed in italics.
nature: air, fire, water, and earth.20 Later, each humor became associated with one
of four temperaments—roughly, clusters of psychological and physiological traits and
dispositions. Each temperament involved a tendency to feel characteristic passions,
engage in certain actions, and develop physical features and ailments associated with
related body archetypes. Though individuals, and whole nations, were often thought
to be born with prevailing temperaments, a person’s temperament could sometimes
change with shifts in life-stage, environment, or season. It was thought that the more
of a given humor one had, the more its corresponding temperament was expressed,
and vice versa.21
20See the discussion of Galen’s On the Doctrine of Hippocrates and Plato in Jouanna (2012),
338–40.
21The idea that regional climates and mores were responsible not only for regional illnesses and
physiques, but also characters, exists already in Hippocratic writings. See, for example, Airs Waters
Places Ch. 12–24 in Jones (1931), Vol. 1, 104–37. The association of humors with character types
can be found already in Galen’s later works. See the discussion in Jouanna (2012), 340. But a
more robust theory of four temperaments only emerged in the several centuries following Galen.
See, especially, the pseudo-Galenic On the Humours in Grant (2000), 17. See, also, several texts
in Greek and Latin that are either modeled on that pseudo-Galenic text or share a common model
with that text, displayed in Jouanna (2012), 341–58.
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Humoral therapies aimed at restoring humoral balance by dissolving or curbing the
production of excessive humors, or promoting the production or retention of deficient
ones. This was accomplished first and foremost by the adoption of regimens for
the so-called “six non-naturals”: food, evacuation of wastes, exercise, air, sleep, and
passions. Activities like study, music, and various social pleasures were prescribed for
the effects they had on one’s passionate, and so humoral, constitution. If the ailment
was severe, more invasive treatment, like purgative herbs or blood-letting, was used to
expel excessive humors. But this harsher treatment was generally reserved for cases
in which diet and regimen would not suffice.22
The rich set of humoral associations provided a framework for disease prognosis,
diagnosis, treatment, and prevention. Because blood was thought to predominate in
the spring and in youth, for example, special precautions would be taken in those
times to avoid and treat ailments of excessive blood, like hemorrhaging. Sanguine
youths, for example, were made to avoid meats and other ‘blood-rich’ foods, vigorous
exercise in the heat, and excessive mirth.23
One disease, perhaps more than any other, garnered perennial interest among
writers in the humoral tradition. This was melancholy: a lingering agitation, depres-
sion, or madness, without fever, that was usually attended with baseless fear and
sadness.24 According to humoral theory, melancholy was the extreme expression of
a dominating humor—in this case, black bile. Indeed, the word ‘melancholy’ comes
22See the discussion in Robert Burton’s 1621 Anatomy of Melancholy 2.4.1.1, EL 210–12, which
frequently cites Galen, among many others. This English-language text, which collects quotations
from two millennia of medical, philosophical, religious, and literary treatments of melancholy and
medicine, gives an impressively accurate and complete representation of the humoral tradition up
until Burton’s own day. I thus cite it as an invaluable source. Citations to this text, hereafter
abbreviated Anatomy, refer to the part, section, member, and subsection numbers, followed by
page numbers from the 1964 Everyman’s Library edition (Burton 1621/1964). Volume numbers
correspond with Burton’s part numbers.
23See Hippocrates, Regimen in Health, Ch. 1, 7 in Jones (1931), Vol. 4, 44–47 and 54–57.
24See Anatomy 1.1.3.1, EL 169–70.
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from the Greek for black (melas) and bile (kholos). Cold, dry black bile was associ-
ated with reflection, pensiveness, idleness, and caution in moderate quantities, and
depression, doubt, paralysis, and madness in excessive quantities. Black bile encour-
aged arduous, focused thought—the kind employed in mathematics, philosophy, and
other sober or scholarly pursuits.25 And those pursuits encouraged more black bile,
either directly26 or because they tended to inspire melancholic sentiments when they,
through their content or difficulty, revealed our own cognitive limitations.27
Humoral allusions pervade Hume’s discussion of melancholy. Hume calls his
melancholy a “deplorable condition,”28 and depicts it in a way that fits the clas-
sic humoral description of the ailment: a sustained depression with bouts of madness
attended by unprompted fear and sadness. He describes his melancholy as a “delir-
ium,”29 and himself as “affrighted” and “forlorn.”30 When Hume describes his survey
of his philosophy’s skeptical strands as “heat[ing his] brain,”31 he alludes to one of
the primary ways accumulated black bile was thought to cause melancholic delirium:
Black bile in the abdomen or blood produces hot vapors which rise to the brain,
heat it, and obscure thought.32 Accordingly, Hume describes himself as tormented
25This provides an answer to the following question from the Aristotelian/Theophrastian Prob-
lems: “Why is it that all those who have become eminent in philosophy or politics or poetry or
the arts are clearly of an atrabilious [i.e., melancholic] temperament, and some of them to such an
extent as to be affected by diseases caused by black bile?” (Book 30, Ch. 1, 953a10–14, translation
from Barnes 1984). See also Anatomy 1.2.2.6, EL 247; 1.3.1.4, EL 406–08; 2.2.3.8, EL 206–07.
26Fixed or repetitive thinking and mental application were thought to dry the brain, exhaust
bodily heat, and stall digestive processes, so that the food is converted into black bile in place of
blood (see Anatomy 1.2.2.6, EL 245–49 and 1.2.3.15, EL 301–05).
27See, for example, the tenth-century Islamic physician Ishaq ibn Imram, who says: “all
those. . . who overexert themselves in reading philosophical books, or books on medicine and logic,
or books which permit a view of all things. . . assimilate melancholy. . . in the consciousness of their
intellectual weakness, and in their distress thereat” (Klibansky et al. 1964/2019, 84–85).
28T 1.4.7.8, SBN 269.
29T 1.4.7.9, SBN 269.
30T 1.4.7.2, SBN 264.
31T 1.4.7.8, SBN 268.
32See Anatomy 1.1.3.1–4, EL 169–77; 1.3.3, EL 419–22. See also Timothie Bright’s 1586 A Treatise
of Melancholly, 2: “Abundance or immoderate hotenesse. . . yeeldeth up to the braine certaine vapors,
whereby the understanding is obscured.”
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with “clouds”33 and a “storm.”34 Melancholics were thought to retreat to dark, soli-
tary places and imagine themselves to have transformed into fearful beasts.35 In the
throes of melancholy, Hume reports: “I fancy myself some strange uncouth monster,
who not being able to mingle and unite in society, has been expell’d from all human
commerce, and left utterly abandon’d and disconsolate. . . . inviron’d with the deep-
est darkness.”36 This leaves Hume craving, among other things, the “warmth of the
crowd”37 to counterbalance black bile’s frigidity and tendency toward isolation.
Hume does in fact break free from his melancholy by joining the crowd. He dines,
plays backgammon, and makes merry with friends.38 In enjoying social pleasures,
he partakes in the most common humoral remedies for melancholy. According to
humoral theory, melancholy tends to nurture itself by encouraging strained and ob-
sessive thoughts. Social pleasures combat this vicious cycle, by distracting us from
these thoughts and promoting blood.39 Hume emphasizes these two points. He tells
us that a “person of a sorrowful and melancholy disposition is very credulous of every
thing, that nourishes his prevailing passion.”40 And, in the Treatise’s second book, he
33T 1.4.7.9, SBN 269.
34T 1.4.7.2, SBN 264.
35See French physician André Du Laurens’s 1594 A Discourse of the Preservation of Sight: of
Melancholike Diseases; of Rheumes, and of Old Age, 82: “The melancholike man. . . maketh himselfe
a terrour unto himselfe, as the beast which looketh himself in a glasse. . . [H]e can not live with
companie. To conclude, hee is become a savadge creature, haunting the shadowed places, suspicious,
soliterie, enemie to the Sunne, and one whom nothing can please, but onely discontent.” See
also the following stanza of poetry which prefaces Burton’s Anatomy and summarizes melancholy’s
psychological symptoms: “’Tis my sole plague to be alone, / I am a beast, a monster grown, / I
will no light nor company, / I will find it now my misery. / The scene is turn’d, my joys are gone, /
fear, discontent, and sorrows come. / All my grief to this are folly, / Naught so fierce as melancholy”
(Anatomy, “The Author’s Abstract of Melancholy,” Vol. 1, p. 12). For a discussion of melancholy
and lycanthropy, see Jackson (1990), Ch. 14.
36T 1.4.7.2, SBN 264; 1.4.7.8, SBN 269.
37T 1.4.7.2, SBN 264.
38T 1.4.7.9, SBN 269.
39See Anatomy 2.2.4, EL 69–99; 2.2.6.1–4, EL 109–26. See also Ishaq ibn Imran’s prescription of
“pleasant discourse” (Klibansky et al. 1964/2019, 85). The use of purgatives and blood-letting was
comparatively rare. See Anatomy 2.4.2, EL 225–34; 2.5.1.3, EL 238–41; 2.5.1.2, EL 237.
40T 1.3.10.4, SBN 120. Similarly, Hume says of melancholy that “’tis usual for that passion, above
all others, to indulge itself” (T 1.4.7.1, SBN 263–64).
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explains that our natural aversion to melancholy urges us to seek out the excitements
of social life:
Those, who take a pleasure in declaiming against human nature, have
observ’d, that man is altogether insufficient to support himself; and that
when you loosen all the holds, which he has of external objects, he im-
mediately drops down into the deepest melancholy and despair. From
this, say they, proceeds that continual search after amusement in gaming,
in hunting, in business; by which we endeavour to forget ourselves, and
excite our spirits from the languid state, into which they fall, when not
sustain’d by some brisk and lively emotion. To this method of thinking I
so far agree, that I own the mind to be insufficient, of itself, to its own en-
tertainment, and that it naturally seeks after foreign objects, which may
produce a lively sensation, and agitate the spirits. On the appearance of
such an object it awakes, as it were, from a dream: The blood flows with
a new tide: The heart is elevated: And the whole man acquires a vigour,
which he cannot command in his solitary and calm moments.41
Here, Hume agrees with the misanthropes that our distaste for melancholy drives a
“continual,” and so inevitable, “search for amusement.” Such amusements, he agrees,
“produce a lively sensation,” dispelling the melancholy. Notably, Hume adds a fur-
ther, physiological explanation: The amusement dispels the melancholy by causing a
“new tide” of blood. While this remark can naturally evoke the mechanistic physiolo-
gies that emerged in the late seventeenth century,42 it is equally at home in a humoral
framework. In the latter, the connection to psychology is more direct. Warm, wet
blood was thought to be the most abundant humor, and for that reason the most
41T 2.2.4.4, SBN 352–53.
42See the discussion of mechanistic physiologies in §§3–4 below.
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balanced and typically conducive to health. Accordingly, the sanguine temperament,
brought about by a predominance of blood, was social, carefree, active, and opti-
mistic, though sometimes headstrong. Hume’s use of the word ‘sanguine’ would seem
to agree. For he speaks of “sanguine tempers” that are “social” and “sincere” but
“impetuous,”43 as well as the “sanguine hopes of young adventurers.”44 It is thus
plausible that he would see an increase in blood or circulation as helping to present
philosophy in an attractive light—as an enterprise in which one may make real ac-
complishments. That could foster adventurous passions like curiosity and ambition.
Hume’s merriments over dinner and backgammon play a pivotal role in his recov-
ery. The infusion of warm blood they provide raises him from the darkest depths.
It cuts short his obsessive, despondent reflections and invigorates him, breaking his
paralysis. But Hume’s recovery is not yet complete. Philosophical speculations do not
yet interest him, but rather appear “so cold” in contrast to the invigoration of social
life that Hume “cannot find it in [his] heart to enter into them any farther.”45 The
contrast is perspicuous because the blood infusion does not fully vanquish Hume’s
melancholy, leaving significant “remains of [that] former disposition.”46 The extent of
this melancholic residue may reflect the severity of Hume’s initial humoral imbalance.
While melancholic, he “fanc[ies himself] in the most deplorable condition possible,
inviron’d with the deepest darkness, and utterly depriv’d of the use of every member
and faculty.”47 Correcting that degree of excess calls for drastic medicine. When
regimen does not suffice, a purge may be needed to restore balance.
Hume does not mention purgative medicines. But the next stage of his recovery
is characterized by a desire for a purge of sorts. For Hume, the poison which must
43H 3.24.31; 3.27.11; 3.27.20.
44H 5.41.43. See, also, H 3.25.27; EHU 1.12, SBN 12.
45T 1.4.7.9, SBN 269.
46T 1.4.7.10, SBN 269.
47T 1.4.7.8, SBN 269.
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be expelled is philosophy. He reports, “I am ready to throw all my books and papers
into the fire.”48 Of the four humors, yellow bile, or choler, was seen as most suited for
purgation. Its heat and dryness were thought to encourage diarrhea and vomiting—
hence, the name of the disease cholera. Likewise, many melancholy-purging drugs
had hot and dry natures.49 This allowed them to dissolve and evacuate black bile
which persisted through treatment by regimen. It is fitting, then, that Hume wishes
to destroy his books with hot, dry fire—the element associated with yellow bile.
Hume describes himself in this stage as “governed” by a “splenetic humour.”50
One of the senses of the word ‘splenetic’ is ‘melancholic.’ So it is tempting to think
Hume is returning to black bile here—after all, black bile is thought to reside in
the spleen, and some melancholic diseases to result from spleen dysfunction.51 But
‘splenetic’ has another, quite different meaning of ‘given or liable to fits of angry
impatience or irritability; ill-humored, testy, irascible.’ The Oxford English Dictio-
nary lists this sense as particularly common throughout the eighteenth century, when
Hume wrote.52 And it seems to be the sense Hume has in mind, since the splenetic
humor makes him impulsive and aggressive. These dispositions are more characteris-
tic of the bilious or choleric temperament than the melancholic.53 And the presence
of fire imagery further suggests that it is a surge of yellow bile which clears Hume of
melancholic residue.
Still, no curiosity or ambition emerges at this stage. For the yellow bile fosters a
felt aggression toward philosophy, which now seems an enemy—“against the current
48T 1.4.7.10, SBN 269.
49Such as asarum, laurel, and sea onion. See Anatomy 2.4.2, EL 225–26.
50T 1.4.7.10, SBN 269.
51See Jouanna (2012), 231n4 and Jackson (1990), 9–10.
52Relatedly, in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, ‘to spleen someone’ meant “to have a
grudge at” him or her (OED, S: 637–41). The entries on ‘spleen’ and cognates in Samuel Johnson’s
1755 Dictionary of the English Language agree.
53Anatomy 1.3.1.3, EL 401.
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of nature,” even “torture.”54 Hume’s curiosity and ambition return only after he has
“tir’d with amusement and company, and [has] indulg’d a revery in [his] chamber, or
a solitary walk by a riverside.” Only then does he report: “I feel my mind all collected
within itself, and am naturally inclin’d to carry my mind” to philosophical topics.55
These quiet, calming activities and resulting composure are plausibly associated with
the fourth and final humor: phlegm.56 People with phlegmatic temperaments are
generally peaceful, inactive, and equanimous, when not just slothful or indolent. And
Hume’s “riverside” walk gives a subtle nod to phlegm’s association with water.57
Hume’s phlegmatic activities are a fitting rejoinder to his previous splenetic humor,
given that cool, wet phlegm is most opposed to hot, dry yellow bile. But they would
have offered no therapy, and so would not have promoted balance, while Hume was
under the influence of excessive black bile. At that stage, black bile would have
filled those quiet and solitary moments with obsessive and despondent thoughts. But
the same activities can be therapeutic now that blood has dissolved, and yellow bile
expunged, the excessive black bile. With the added phlegm they provide, Hume can
“collect” his mind. And once it is collected, he can emerge from the phlegm to engage
in more focused thought.
Having made a full cycle through all four humors, Hume finds himself in humoral
balance. Health is restored, and with it the inclination to indulge in some reflection.
Only now does Hume feel the “curiosity to be acquainted with the principles of moral
good and evil, the nature and foundation of government, and the cause of those
several passions and inclinations, which actuate and govern [him].”58 As if to drive
54T 1.4.7.10, SBN 269–70.
55T 1.4.7.12, SBN 270.
56Hume sometimes uses ‘phlegm’ to mean coolness or indifference. See E Sc 55, Mil 180.
57This association is reflected in the use of the word ‘phlegmatick’ in Hume’s time to describe
the watery parts of solutions. Johnson (1756) lists “watry” as a sense of the adjective, and cites
Newton’s usage in distinguishing the flammable part of wine from the “phlegmatick” part.
58T 1.4.7.12, SBN 270–71.
15
home the requirement of balanced humors for curiosity, Hume invites readers “of the
same easy disposition” as him to join him in further speculation, while advising those
who are not to “wait the returns of application and good humour.”59
We can summarize the humoral reading of the transformation as follows:
Hume’s stages in 1.4.7, with corresponding humors
melancholy → sociability → aggression → composure → curiosity
black bile → blood → yellow bile → phlegm → health
Earlier, I asked why Hume undergoes the particular succession of stages in 1.4.7.
The humoral reading answers this interpretive question. It explains why there are five
stages, in the order they appear, with the characteristic sentiments and activities they
have. The melancholic humor and temperament urges an eventual invigoration of the
blood through social activity; this leaves significant melancholic remains, which must
be purged through the aggression of yellow bile; the restoration of phlegm must come
last among the individual humors, because so long as significant melancholic excess
remains, phlegmatic activities will fill Hume with desponding thoughts and plunge
him back into melancholy; and health comes after that because it requires a balance
of all the humors. If the humoral vocabulary and imagery throughout 1.4.7 offered
nothing more than a dramatic tone, then the interpretive question would remain
unaddressed. But in fact Hume’s language can clue us in to the framework in which
he conceives of his recovery—a framework which explains the succession of its stages.
We can still ask: To what extent is this progression particular to Hume? Is
Hume’s description of it meant to be more than a self-report? Is it more? If Hume’s
imbalance is especially severe, his cure too might be somewhat unusual. It might not
always be necessary, for example, to cycle through all four humors in order to reach a
59T 1.4.7.14, SBN 273.
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balance. Perhaps sometimes a new tide of blood from “some avocation” may suffice
as medicine. Hume may perhaps even allow that a melancholic “bent of mind” could,
in some cases, “relax” on its own.60 Humoral theory does not always require the
precise sequence of 1.4.7 to restore balance. Instead, the rich and systematic humoral
language of 1.4.7 show vividly that Hume conceives of recovery in humoral terms.
3 The anachronism objection
The humoral reading portrays Hume as drawing systematically from an ancient theory
of medicine. But Hume is in many ways a modern thinker. He wrote in a time of
“enlightenment,” often characterized in terms of its replacement of classical scientific
theories with remarkable innovations. Reading Hume as appealing to an antiquated,
and to us occult, theory of medicine can then seem anachronistic and fantastic. I
call this ‘the anachronism objection.’ If the objection is correct, we might then read
Hume’s uses of ‘melancholy’ to be like ours, referring to a sentiment divorced from
any associated humor or temperament.61 Indeed, we might wonder whether Hume
was familiar with humoral theory at all.
A first step toward answering this objection is to show that Hume was indeed
familiar with humoral theory. If the abundant humoral language of 1.4.7 does not
convince us, there is strong evidence elsewhere in Hume’s corpus. In Dialogues Con-
cerning Natural Religion, for example, Hume’s character Philo expresses a humoral
conception of health: “On the mixture and secretion of the humours and juices of the
60T 1.4.7.9, SBN 269. Compare T 1.4.2.57, SBN 218, where Hume describes a certain “sceptical
doubt” as a “malady” that cannot be “radically cur’d” but whose proper “remedy” nonetheless is
“carelessness and in-attention.” Inattention is, for Hume, necessary to lead us away from certain
skeptical reasonings, and so out of the doubt or gloom which they can produce. But inattention
alone may not always succeed in restoring our interest in philosophy. That is often more involved,
as it is in 1.4.7.
61Hume does call melancholy a “passion” at T 1.4.7.1, SBN 264 and T 2.1.11.2, SBN 317.
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body depend the health and prosperity of the animal,” as humors “frequently become
pernicious, by [their] excess or defect.”62 Soon after, Philo speaks of the “600 different
muscles” and “284 bones” of Galenic anatomy,63 suggesting the author’s knowledge
of Galenic doctrines. In the Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, Hume de-
scribes a painful case of gout as caused by “malignant humours in [the] body.”64 In
the History of England, Hume describes no less than three historical figures as dy-
ing from melancholy.65 And in the Treatise, he seems to endorse the theory when
he says, for example, that “the mixture of humours and the composition of minute
parts may justly be presum’d to be somewhat different in men from what it is in
mere animals.”66 In these passages, Hume suggests that our bodies are composed of
humors and that humoral imbalance causes disorders. These are the fundamentals of
humoral theory.
Hume’s familiarity with humoral theory is also suggested by its presence in the
philosophical and critical texts Hume read while preparing the Treatise. Cicero’s
Tusculan Disputations, for instance, draws an analogy between the “disorder” of a
mind plagued by false education and “distempers and sickness. . . bred in the body
from the corruption of blood, and the too great abundance of phlegm and bile.”67
More notable yet are the vivid references to the theory of temperaments in Abbé
J.B. Dubos’s 1719 Critical reflections on poetry, painting and music, which Hume no
doubt read in preparation for his planned portion of the Treatise on “Criticism.”68
These appear, for example, in Dubos’s explanations of how painters “bring us ac-
62DNR 11.11, KS 209–10.
63DNR 12.3, KS 215.
64EHU 8.34, SBN 101.
65The Earl of Marre at H 5.40.64; Queen Elizabeth at H 5.44.60; and Mrs. Claypole at H 7.61.89.
66T 2.1.12.2, SBN 325.
67Book IV, Ch. X, p. 136 in Cicero (1877). Hume says in “My Own Life” that he “devoured”
Cicero’s writings in his early years (E MOL 3, Mil xxxii–xxxiii). In an early letter to Michael
Ramsey, he specifically mentions “a Tusculan Dispute of Cicero’s” (HL 1.10).
68Promised at T Intro.5, SBN xv–xvi.
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quainted with. . . the temperament” of their subjects, using physiognomy, hair color,
and posture.69 He writes of Charles-Antoine Coypel’s Susanna Accused of Adultery :
The painter has diversified the complexions of the famous old men [crowded
around the accused]; one appears fresh and sanguine, and the other cho-
leric and melancholy. The latter, pursuant to the proper character of his
temperament, which is obstinacy, commits the crime with heat and resolu-
tion. Rage and fury spread through his whole countenance. The sanguine
old fellow seems to relent, and, notwithstanding all the transport of his
passion, feels a remorse that staggers his resolution. This is the natural
character of men of that kind of complexion.70
In this passage and others, Dubos invokes groupings of imagistic, physiognomic, and
psychological tropes that have their root in Galenic writings—the choleric’s face be-
trays the “heat” of his rage and fury. Such passages surely contributed to Hume’s
fluency with the psychology and imagery associated with the four temperaments.71
But even had Hume never read Dubos, these associations would still have been
familiar from the literary canon. To deny this would be to claim that Hume never
encountered or appreciated Shakespeare’s “life. . . made of four,”72 or Milton’s “melan-
choly damp of a cold and dry,”73 or any of Ben Jonson’s numerous “comedies of hu-
69Dubos (1748), 78. The first French edition was printed in 1719.
70Dubos (1748), 82–83; see also 214–15 for comparison of the choleric-sanguine with the melan-
cholic in Julio Romano’s “great alter” at St. Stephen’s.
71Hume has two notes on Dubos in his extant memoranda from his years writing the Treatise.
See Mossner (1948), 500, No. 2–3 in Section II (labeled “Philosophy”). Dubos’s Critical Reflections
also appears in the library Hume passed on to his cousin at his death (Norton and Norton 1996, 88,
No. 385).
72Sonnet XLV.
73Paradise Lost, Part II, Book XI, lines 542–45.
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mours,”74 not to mention the frequent humoral allusions throughout Molière’s plays.75
Educated eighteenth century readers—Hume included—were well acquainted with the
use of humoral tropes to capture certain well-worn character types and to explore piv-
otal facets of human nature—for example, our caprice, tendency towards extremity,
incompleteness in romantic longing, or mortality.76 In such a context, there was noth-
ing bizarre about Hume’s drawing inspiration from humoral theory, whose imagery
he rightly expected his readers to recognize.
If Hume had detailed knowledge of humoral theory, it is not unnatural to take
the abundant humoral language of 1.4.7 at face value. Hume would have understood
what he was so repeatedly alluding to. Nevertheless, those familiar with Hume’s
scientific context may still doubt that Hume meant these allusions as more than
dramatic flourishes. Despite its enduring presence in European culture and thought,
humoral theory was in decline, and, at the academies of the young Hume’s Scotland,
had largely been replaced by more modern medical theories. There, like much of
the early eighteenth century British Isles, a mechanistic physiology was in vogue.77
Contemporary Scottish mechanists like George Cheyne viewed “the Human Body”
as a “Machin of infinite Number and Variety of different Channels and Pipes, filled
with various and different Liquors and Fluids.”78
74See, especially, Asper’s memorable discussion of the literal and figurative uses of the word
‘humour’ in the prologue to Every Man Out of His Humour. This begins with a brief capitulation of
humoral theory, after which Asper explains that the word “may, by Metaphore, applie itself / Unto
the generall disposition” of a person (lines 95–124).
75See, especially, The Misanthrope, or the Melancholic [Atrabilaire] Lover and The Imaginary
Invalid. Hume was surely already familiar with Molière when writing the Treatise. His praise for
French theater is expressed in a 1741 essay, published just one year after the Treatise’s completion:
“With regard to the stage, they [the French] have excelled even the Greeks, who far excelled the
English” (E CL 6, Mil 90–91). The Nortons include Molière’s Oeuvres in six volumes in Hume’s
library (Norton and Norton 1996, 115, No. 876–77).
76On humoral physiology in English literature, see Robin (1911), 19–45; Babb (1951), 1–20; Moore
(1953), 181ff.
77On the reception and transformation of mechanistic physiology by the Scottish, see Brown
(1968); Guerrini (1985); and Wright (1991), esp. 255–56.
78Cheyne (1733), 4.
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By itself, an understanding of Hume’s medical context can simply lead us to think
that Hume himself was out of touch with current medicine. But, as interpreters have
noted,79 mechanistic views can also be found in Hume’s own writings. Throughout the
Treatise’s “anatomy of the mind,”80 Hume’s pervasive talk of the transfer of force and
vivacity from impression to idea seems to draw on the notions of particle motion and
fluid dynamics so central to mechanistic physiology. Describing this sort of transfer
in the case of poetical associations, Hume says that the “vividness. . . is convey’d, as
by so many pipes or canals”81—an image reminiscent of Cheyne’s body of “Channels
and Pipes.” Moreover, Hume’s brief but repeated appeals to the ‘animal spirits’ in
belief, association, and error reflect the brand of Cartesian mechanism which Hume
encountered in the works of Malebranche and Mandeville. He seems to accept the
thesis that the twists and turns of thought correlate with the motions of spirits, subtle
fluids coursing through interconnected traces in the brain tissue.82 These passages,
and others, demonstrate the great influence of mechanistic physiology on his thought.
Perhaps more to the point in a discussion of Treatise 1.4.7, Hume had available
non-humoral accounts of the nature and causes of melancholy. He shows his familiar-
ity with one of these in a 1734 letter addressed to an anonymous physician, possibly
Cheyne.83 In the letter, Hume complains of a depressive “Distemper” with “re-
peated Interruptions” of his “Train of Thought,” initially diagnosed as “the Disease
of the Learned.”84 As interpreters have noted, this particular label for melancholic
79See Wright (1983), esp. 187–246.
80T 2.1.12.2, SBN 326; cf. 1.4.6.23, SBN 263; 3.3.6.6, SBN 620–21; A 2, SBN 646.
81T 1.3.10.7, SBN 122; cf. DP 6.19, Bea 29.
82See T 1.2.5.20, SBN 60–61; 1.3.8.2, SBN 98–99; 1.3.10.9–10, SBN 123; 1.4.1.10, SBN 185;
1.4.7.10, SBN 269–70; 2.1.1.1, SBN 275; 2.1.5.11, SBN 289–90; 2.2.8.4, SBN 373–74. For discussion,
see Wright (1983), 187–246, esp. 190–91, 214–19; Frasca-Spada (2003); Kail (2008), 66–67, 74.
83Burton (1846), 42 lists Cheyne as the intended recipient, as does Greig (1932/2011)), viii, 12n2.
Mossner (1944) disagrees, suggesting instead John Arbuthnot. I find the rejoinders to Mossner’s
arguments in Wright (2003) convincing. Since the discussion below does not depend on the letter’s
intended recipient, I leave my own arguments in favor of Cheyne for another time.
84HL 3.14–16.
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or “hypochondrical” disorders likely derives from Mandeville’s 1715 A Treatise of
Hypochondriack and Hysterick Passions.85 That text favorably repeats mechanistic
views, while mocking Galenism.86 According to Mandeville, melancholy occurs when
“the labour of the Brain [has] exhausted. . . the finest Spirits.”87 Hume seems to em-
ploy this mechanistic accoubt in his letter. He compares and contrasts his “present
Condition” with a “Want of Spirits,” describes philosophical studies as “wasting”
his spirits, and asks whether his “Spirits [will ever] regain their former Spring and
Vigor.”88 This strongly suggests that Hume had a mechanistic account of melancholy
available, and indeed one that was more in line with his scientific context. Why insist
that it is Hume who is out of touch, and not the humoral reading?
I think neither is out of touch. Despite the rise of newer physiologies, humoral
theory continued to influence the medicine of Hume’s time. As medical historians
have noted, humoral theory’s decline was “slow, one of evolution rather than revo-
lution,” and still incomplete.89 Amidst all the innovation, Galenism remained sur-
prisingly entrenched in Scottish medical practice. Early eighteenth century Scottish
85Wright (1983), 216ff, 236n10. Mandeville’s writings were among Hume’s early sources. In the
Treatise, Hume portrays Mandeville as a champion of experimental philosophy (T Intro.7n1, SBN
xvii; A 2, SBN 646).
86See Mandeville (1715), 38, 108–10; and 11–14, 80, 188–89, respectively.
87Mandeville (1715), 149.
88HL 3.13, 14, 18.
89Porter (1987), 47. As Porter points out, many humoral ideas, and some humoral terms, survived
the shift to the newer physiological frameworks, often by being partially reduced to, explained by,
or made to serve elements of the latter. As he puts it, many proponents of “the new [physiological]
models joined in denouncing Aristotelianism and Galenism as empty and barren—if often in reality
recycling their ideas under a different guise, pouring old wine into new bottles” (Porter 2004, 54).
Jackson (1978), 369–73 gives an excellent example from the iatrochemistry of Thomas Willis. Though
announcing in his 1672 De anima brutorum that “we cannot yield to what some Physicians affirm,
that Melancholy doth arise from a Melancholick humor, somewhere primarily and of itself begotten,”
Willis nonetheless speaks of “yellow Bile of Choler. . . in the Gall-Bladder, or the black Bile so called,
of Melancholick humor in the Spleen” and preserves many humoral ideas (Willis 1683, 189, 192–
93). These include the idea of a murky fluid stored in the spleen; that overabundance of this fluid
causes certain changes throughout the body, leading eventually to irregular movements of ‘spirits’
in the brain; and that these movements underly or simulate the erratic thoughts and passions of a
melancholic break.
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physicians and surgeons continued to diagnose and treat symptoms according to a
humoral scheme, prescribing traditional remedies like blood-letting and purges. Their
familiarity with humoral theory was reinforced by the medical education available.
Before the founding of Edinburgh’s medical school in 1726, aspiring Scottish physi-
cians traveled to mainland Europe, studying at the more affordable universities of
Padua, Reims, and, especially, Leiden. Many of the university courses they attended
consisted primarily in descriptive lectures on classical texts, including broadly hu-
moral treatises from antiquity. At Leiden, for example, MD candidates were required
to expound several Hippocratic aphorisms as a part of their examinations.90 As a re-
sult, most Scottish physicians practicing during Hume’s youth stocked their libraries
with the medical classics, especially Hippocratic texts.91
Even the mechanistic medical texts of Hume’s contemporaries sometimes pre-
served or revived key elements of humoral theory. Cheyne is a good example. His
1724 Essay of Health and Long Life focuses on the management of the classic six
“non-naturals”: “1. The Air we breath in. 2. Our Meat and Drink. 3. Our Sleep
and Watching. 4. Our Exercise and Rest. 5. Our Evacuation and their Obstructions.
6. The Passions of our Minds.”92 This six-part division of the regimen structures the
entire text. And Cheyne concludes with a call for balance strongly reminiscent of the
Hippocratic doctrine of health as proper proportion, urging his readers to “observe
the golden Mean in all their Passions, Appetites and Desires.”93 Similarly, Cheyne’s
1733 treatise on melancholy, The English Malady, revived the Hippocratic notion of
90This practice continued beyond the turn of the eighteenth century, even after Hermann Boer-
haave’s influence brought to medical pedagogy a greater focus on the practical dimensions of diag-
nosis and treatment. Eventually, Boerhaave’s own aphorisms were used for final examinations. But
neither of these changes challenged the status of the medical classics in Leiden’s course of study.
Indeed, Boerhaave’s inaugural lecture was a panegyric for the study of Hippocrates. See Dingwall





a national temperament, shaped by atmospheric conditions and cultural mores, and
involving a proneness to certain diseases—in England’s case, a variety of “nervous
Distempers.”94 Even if Cheyne’s mechanism abandoned the schema of four humors,
his medicine still preserved important elements from the humoral tradition. These in-
clude the idea of health as a kind of balance; the idea that health is best maintained
and restored through the management of the six non-naturals; and the idea that
atmospheric and geographical conditions shaped national characters and diseases.
Ultimately, the humoral reading, as I defined it, does not require commitment to
the underlying physiology of the four humors. It attributes to Hume the view that
health requires a balance of the temperaments of humoral theory. This conception
of health was by no means long gone in Hume’s day, and it is not antiquarian to
suggest that he took it seriously. Though certainly in decline, humoral medicine still
had some currency in Hume’s Scotland. In this respect, the anachronism objection is
itself anachronistic. Still, the objection raises an important question that has so far
not been answered. Did Hume in fact believe in the underlying physiology of the four
bodily humors? The evidence of his mechanism can leave a lingering doubt about the
extent to which he accepted humoral theory. To answer this question, I turn next to
Hume’s views about the role of physiology in his philosophical method.
4 The methodology objection
The humoral reading can seem fundamentally at odds with Hume’s experimental
method in the Treatise. For Hume seems to express a methodological commitment
to avoid appealing to any specific theory of human physiology. When leaving aside
certain passions in the Treatise’s second book, Hume says: “the examination of them
94Cheyne (1733), i–ii. On national temperament in Hippocrates, see note 21 above.
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wou’d lead me too far from my present subject, into the sciences of anatomy and
natural philosophy.”95 The same commitment seems to underlie Hume’s introduc-
tion of “impressions of sensation” as “aris[ing] in the soul originally, from unknown
causes.”96 By choosing not to specify the causes of such impressions, Hume can seem
to relegate the laws by which they enter the mind to natural philosophy, excluding
them from philosophy proper. His doing so can seem to suggest that he thinks such
laws would fail to give properly philosophical explanations of mental phenomena.97
And that would seem to suggest that Hume would bar physiological theories from
doing explanatory work in his philosophy. If that is right, and Hume stays faithful to
this methodological commitment, then he cannot appeal to humoral theory to explain
the succession of impressions and ideas in 1.4.7. I call this the methodology objection.
One possible reply is to deny that Hume is fully faithful to this methodological
commitment, if he holds it at all. For Hume seems to give numerous, straightforwardly
physiological explanations of mental phenomena. He says, for example, that an “ex-
traordinary ferment of the blood and spirits” is a cause of madness, and a “new tide”
of blood interrupts melancholy.98 In at least one passage, Hume explicitly announces
that he “must. . . have recourse” to physiology to explain the mental phenomenon at
issue. There, he is trying to “account for the mistakes that arise from [the] relations”
of resemblance, contiguity, and causation. In other words, Hume wants to explain
why, when thinking about some object, we replace it, without being aware that we
are doing so, with another object that only resembles the first, or that we previously
experienced nearby or in close succession with the first. To do so, he conducts “an
imaginary dissection of the brain”:
95T 2.1.1.2, SBN 275–76. These are the immediate passions which “without introduction make
their appearance in the soul,” and so “depend upon natural and physical causes.”
96T 1.1.2.1, SBN 7, my italics.
97See Broughton (2008), 43–44; Alanen (2008), 184–85.
98T 1.3.10.9, SBN 123; 2.2.4.4, SBN 352–53.
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I shall. . . observe, that as the mind is endow’d with a power of exciting any
idea it pleases; whenever it dispatches the spirits into that region of the
brain, in which the idea is plac’d; these spirits always excite the idea, when
they run precisely into the proper traces, and rummage that cell, which
belongs to the idea. But as their motion is seldom direct, and naturally
turns a little to the one side or the other; for this reason the animal spirits,
falling into the contiguous traces, present other related ideas in lieu of that
which the mind desir’d at first to survey. This change we are not always
sensible of; but continuing still the same train of thought, make use of the
related idea, which is presented to us, and employ it in our reasoning, as
if it were the same with what we demanded. This is the cause of many
mistakes and sophisms in philosophy; as will naturally be imagin’d, and
as it wou’d be easy to shew, if there was occasion.99
On the psychophysiological theory of mind Hume invokes, each idea is “plac’d” in a
region of the brain. When the mind is about to “excite” a certain idea, it “dispatches”
the spirits, sending them along traces in the brain tissue toward a “cell” which houses
that idea. If the spirits reach the cell, we form the idea. But since the flow of the
spirits is naturally a bit erratic, the spirits divert into nearby traces, and so arrive
at different cells and lead us to form different ideas. So far, this falls short of a
complete explanation of why the ideas we end up with bear relations of resemblance,
contiguity, or causation to the first idea—the one toward whose cell the spirits were
first “dispatched.” For that, we would need a further story about why ideas which
bear these relations are located on contiguous brain traces. Hume does not give this
story. He instead seems to presuppose his readers’ familiarity with it—that his talk
99T 1.2.5.20, SBN 60–61.
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of ‘spirits,’ ‘cells,’ and ‘traces’ would be sufficient to prompt his readers to fill in the
relevant details.100 We need not concern ourselves with the details here.
The passage is of interest insofar as it seems to be a stark example of Hume
reaching for a physiological explanation. It is true that Hume apologizes for the
explanation he gives here, noting that it is in conflict with the “first maxim” of his
philosophy. But that maxim does not say or imply that he must avoid physiological
explanation. It instead says “that we must rest contented with experience” as the test
of our judgments. Hume’s “dissection” violates that maxim because the physiology
he appeals to is “an imaginary dissection of the brain,” rather than one drawn from
experience.101 In short, he apologizes not for his explanation’s being physiological,
but for its being speculative.
This passage, and others, suggest that Hume does invoke physiological explana-
tions after all. Their prevalence may lead us to question whether it is really a feature
of Hume’s methodology to avoid appeals to physiology. Doubting that Hume holds
such a commitment could perhaps motivate a reading of the seemingly methodological
passages as merely delineating the topic of Hume’s inquiries. On that reading, Hume
does not restrict what sorts of things can figure in his explanations, but rather what
sorts of things he is to explain in the first place. He relieves himself of the obligation
to give explanations that would take him deep into the details of human physiology.
And he is prudent to do so, since such explanations would require “experiments” of
a very different sort than his “cautious observation of human life. . . in the common
course of the world, by men’s behaviour in company, in affairs, and in their plea-
sures.”102 But this need not bar physiological explanations from appearing in Hume’s
100He would not be presumptuous to expect this. Such a story was implicit in a common seventeenth
and early-eighteenth century view of the ‘imagination,’ which conceived it as a physiological structure
in which sense impressions formed traces. Wright (1983), 188–92 gives a good overview.
101T 1.2.5.20, SBN 60.
102T Intro.10, SBN xix.
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theory of the mind altogether. Perhaps some topics, like that of the sentiments and
ideas which appear in a mind recovering from melancholy, may benefit from drawing
on a rich tradition of physiological explanation.
I think this reply to the methodology objection holds water. But Hume’s “imag-
inary dissection” also provides a second and at least as compelling reply. For his
discussion of the “dissection” suggests a general lesson about why Hume bothers to
state the physiological causes of some of his topics of interest. Just before conducting
the “dissection,” Hume says something very curious:
I shall only premise, that we must distinguish exactly betwixt the phæno-
menon itself [making mistakes across the three relations], and the causes,
which I shall assign for it [the diversion of animal spirits across contiguous
brain traces]; and must not imagine from any uncertainty in the latter,
that the former is also uncertain. The phænomenon may be real, tho’ my
explication be chimerical. The falshood of the one is no consequence of
that of the other.103
Here, Hume tells us that his own physiological explanation for the relevant mistakes
in reasoning might be “chimerical.” His caution here would be in keeping with his
Scottish Newtonian predecessors, who took animal spirits to be an antiquated fic-
tion.104 Nonetheless, Hume reassures his reader that the “falshood” of the causal
explanation he is about to offer would not imply the falsehood of the “principle” he is
trying to explain. But this raises the question: What could be the point of invoking
an admittedly dubious physiological cause? What does Hume hope to gain by doing
that?
103T 1.2.5.20, SBN 60.
104Cheyne (1733), 89, for instance, criticized the animal spirits for being “of the same Leaven with
the substantial Forms of Aristotle and the celestial System of Ptolemy.”
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The answer, I think, is that citing a physiological cause invokes a larger physiolog-
ical story or framework, which serves as a rich source of analogy for thinking about
the mind. Such an answer is suggested by remarks earlier in the Treatise. Here,
Hume discusses the importance of analogy to the “explication” of a certain mental
phenomenon at issue—in this case, how our particular ideas can become general in
their representation. He says: “To explain the ultimate causes of our mental actions
is impossible. ’Tis sufficient, if we can give any satisfactory account of them from
experience and analogy.”105 Hume’s imaginary dissection does not provide us with
an account from experience, since it is imaginary. But Hume’s story about diverted
spirits, and the story about the formation of brain traces which Hume expects his
readers to fill in, together with the general framework of fluid dynamics which both
stories share, provide rich analogies for understanding the kind of error at issue. In
this case, spatial and mechanical notions offer a way to think about how the mind
makes its unnoticed substitutions of ideas across the three relations. Whether or not
the stories have really got our physiology right is not crucial for Hume’s enterprise.
One or more of the stories might turn out to be false, or impossible to judge, but no
matter. The analogies they offer would still, in that case, give anyone familiar with
the stories and frameworks a way of thinking about the mind—a way which could
illustrate the “principle” at issue, and bring about a kind of satisfaction.
If that is right, Hume need not commit himself to the correctness of the exact
physiological stories he gives. In the case of mechanistic explanation, his imaginary
dissection does not require a belief in the existence of animal spirits. This may reveal
a limited sense in which the methodological objection is on point: From time to time,
Hume evinces wariness about committing himself to the literal truth of this or that
physiological theory, even while he is willing to state its theses. As a result, it is often
105T 1.1.7.11, SBN 22.
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unclear from the text whether Hume endorses the physiological theses he states, even
half-heartedly. But his level of endorsement does not always matter for his purposes.
Even someone who rejects those theses could make room for the analogical use of
physiological theses and frameworks, especially if she expected her audience to have
prior familiarity with them.
We can now see that the humoral reading need not attribute endorsement of
humoral physiology to Hume. In the end, I think it is genuinely unclear whether, or
to what extent, Hume believed in humoral physiology. But it does not matter. For
the humoral reading can interpret Hume’s talk of bodily humors as meant to offer
analogies for understanding the workings of the mind. Presumably, such analogies
would suggest that the mind, like humoral theory’s picture of the body, has four basic
elements which, when balanced, constitute health or proper functioning. But that
is precisely the core of humoral theory’s psychological part. The primary resource
Hume borrows from humoral theory, then, is its robust temperament psychology.
When first expounding the humoral reading in §2, I described the progression of
stages in 1.4.7 in largely physiological terms: an excess of black bile, dissolved by a
“new tide” of blood, expunged by yellow bile, cooled by phlegm. Doing so helped
to make perspicuous the various oppositions between the stages, and thus the logic
behind their succession. But we can now take this language to be analogical, and
so read Hume’s progression as modeled only on humoral psychology : melancholy,
invigorated by sanguinity, scorned by biliousness, calmed by phlegm. We can then
summarize the humoral reading finally in terms of a succession of temperaments:
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Hume’s stages in 1.4.7, with corresponding temperaments
melancholy → sociability → aggression → composure → curiosity
melancholic → sanguine → bilious → phlegmatic → even-tempered
This would be a humoral reading which jettisons the underlying physiology of gross
bodily fluids—a reading on which healthy mental functioning consists in the balance
of four basic psychological temperaments, bearing the same relations of opposition
as their physiological counterparts, each having tendencies to cause or be caused by
characteristic sentiments and activities. That would still be a ripe source of explana-
tion.
In summary, the methodology objection objects that Hume would bar physiolog-
ical theories, such as that of humoral medicine, from doing explanatory work in his
philosophy. The first reply I considered was that Hume includes a range of phys-
iological explanations throughout the Treatise. The second reply was that Hume’s
apparent invocations of humoral physiology can be read as analogies, rather than as
literal endorsements, drawing on the precedent set by Hume’s remarks on the use of
analogies in explaining the mind. One reply denies Hume’s exclusion of physiology;
the other accommodates it. In either case, Hume’s invocation of the humors is con-
sistent with his actual method. Either reply is enough to answer the methodology
objection. And I am inclined to think both are correct. Hume makes apparently
physiological claims throughout the Treatise, and 1.4.7 is no exception. And these
claims are a rich source of analogy, whether or not Hume literally believes them.
Either way, the stages of 1.4.7 can be seen as a cycle through the four temperaments
en route to psychic balance.
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5 Reconceiving Hume’s skepticism
The four humors or temperaments, together with their characteristic activities and
sentiments, explain Hume’s succession of stages in 1.4.7. They also provide insight
into his views on skepticism. Hume’s association of skepticism with the melancholic
humor or temperament encourages us to rethink both what he thinks skepticism is,
and what role he takes it to play in human life.
First, the association suggests that skepticism itself can be understood as a tem-
perament, or disposition to think, act, and feel in certain ways, which can be more
or less dominant, and expressed to greater and lesser degrees. The melancholic tem-
perament, which tends to inspire engagement in inquiry, caution in forming beliefs,
and a felt doubt or unease concerning one’s limitations, is a natural candidate for the
tendency of mind Hume labels “scepticism.” When such a temperament dominates,
unchecked by the other temperaments, one loses one’s grip on reality and sinks into
a gloomy “delirium.” But when the temperament is balanced with others, it can
contribute the carefulness, focus, and awareness of one’s abilities needed for sober
and scientific pursuits.106
106In the essay “Of Superstition and Enthusiasm,” Hume claims that superstition arises “from
a gloomy and melancholic disposition,” among other causes (E SE 2, Mil 73). This can seem
to threaten the idea that Hume associates the melancholic temperament with carefulness, since
superstitious people are not careful in forming beliefs. “In such a state of mind,” Hume says, “infinite
unknown evils are dreaded from unknown agents; and where real objects of terror are wanting, the
soul, active to its own prejudice, and fostering its predominant inclination, finds imaginary ones, to
whose power and malevolence it sets no limits” (E SE 2, Mil 74). But the melancholic temperament’s
being a cause of uncautious superstition does not imply that it is not characterized by caution.
Compare The Natural History of Religion, where Hume says that “the mind, sunk into diffidence,
terror, and melancholy, has recourse to every method of appeasing those secret intelligent powers,
on whom our fortune is supposed entirely to depend” (NHR 3.4, Bea 42). Here, even “diffidence”—
the opposite of confidence—is a cause of superstitious belief in invisible and unknown beings. If
anything, this passage suggests a close relationship between melancholy and diffidence, carefulness,
or doubt. There is still a further question about why these qualities should lead into superstition.
I speculate that Hume’s answer would be that such qualities can, in their excess, make one feel
weak, and accordingly vulnerable, even to invisible powers. But whatever Hume’s answer may be,
the tendency of melancholy, and its associated carefulness or doubt, to mutate into superstitious
madness would have already been familiar to him through the humoral tradition.
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The humoral reading alone does not force us to see Hume as viewing skepticism as
a temperament. It only suggests this interpretation. But the suggestion is supported
by the language Hume uses when discussing skepticism. In the Treatise, he speaks of
a “sceptical disposition,”107 and often uses the word ‘disposition’ in close proximity
and interchangeably with ‘temper.’108 Hume acknowledges that this disposition or
temper admits of varying degrees of intensity. In the Appendix to the Treatise, for
example, he speaks of “a modest scepticism to a certain degree.”109 And in Treatise
1.4.3, he speaks of the “true philosopher” as embodying a “moderate scepticism.”110
These modest and moderate degrees contrast with an extreme skepticism, which
Hume labels “total”111 and “extravagant.”112 We can read both of the latter labels as
modifiers that express the intensity or extent of the skeptical temperament: ‘Total,’ on
this reading, connotes reaching a maximum, total dominance; ‘extravagant’ connotes
going too far, a lack of moderation, indulgence. Now, such a reading allows that
“total skepticism” can at times refer to the scope of a doubt—to skepticism about all
of our beliefs. But this is not the only way in which Hume conceives of skepticism
as being or becoming “total.” In the section “Of scepticism with regard to reason”
(1.4.1), he writes of an extreme loss of confidence:
When I reflect on the natural fallibility of my judgment, I have less con-
fidence in my opinions, than when I only consider the objects concerning
which I reason; and when I proceed still farther, to turn the scrutiny
against every successive estimation I make of my faculties, all the rules
of logic require a continual diminution, and at last a total extinction of
107T 1.4.7.10, SBN 269.
108See T 2.2.4.6, SBN 354; 2.3.8.13, SBN 437; 3.3.2.3, SBN 593; cf. 3.2.2.12, SBN 481.
109T 1.2.5.26n12, SBN 639.
110T 1.4.3.10, SBN 224.
111T 1.4.1.7, SBN 183; 1.4.7.7, SBN 268.
112T 1.4.2.50, SBN 214; 1.4.4.6, SBN 227–28; cf. EHU 12.17, SBN 155.
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belief and evidence.113
The melancholic temperament involves a disposition to reason, often repetitively or
obsessively, and often with regard to one’s own weakness or fallibility. One who,
like Hume in this passage, does not just reflect on her fallibility once, but “proceeds
still farther, to turn this scrutiny against every successive estimation” could be seen,
at that moment, as exhibiting an extremely skeptical temperament—indeed, a tem-
perament that has become so ‘total’ that it now entirely characterizes her mental
landscape, eclipsing all opposing dispositions to judge and feel, and so destroying her
confidence in her beliefs. We may read the ‘total scepticism’ of 1.4.1, then, as the
complete domination by a skeptical temperament. As Cleanthes puts it in Hume’s
Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion, “total scepticism” arises “in a flush of hu-
mour.”114
The language of varying degrees is a point of continuity with Hume’s discussions
of skepticism in the first Enquiry.115 In Section XII, he discusses four varieties of skep-
ticism, grouped into two pairs. Strikingly, within each pair one variety is excessive,
and a threat to reasoning and inquiry, while the other is moderate and useful.
Hume’s main concern in this section is the two varieties of skepticism which are
“consequent to science and enquiry.” These are adopted only after discovering the
“absolute fallaciousness” or “unfitness” of our mental faculties for their common and
speculative uses.116 One of these varieties Hume calls “excessive scepticism,” and
associates with the Pyrrhonian skeptics of ancient times.117 The label ‘excessive’
suggests that the skepticism has been taken too far or become too dominant. It is
113T 1.4.1.6, SBN 183.
114DNR 1.6, KS 132–33.
115There are still many important differences between the discussions of skepticism in the Treatise
and the first Enquiry. For a comprehensive discussion, see Qu (2020).
116EHU 12.5, SBN 150.
117EHU 12.23, SBN 159; 12.24, SBN 161; cf. 12.21, SBN 158–59.
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characterized by an attempt to preserve a widespread doubt and sense of “universal
perplexity and confusion.”118 The other variety Hume calls “mitigated scepticism,”119
and associates with the academic skeptics. ‘Mitigated’ suggests a lessening of intensity
through interaction with other forces—hence, it suggests a kind of balance. And,
indeed, Hume says that mitigated skepticism just is the excessive skepticism “in
some measure, corrected” by other tendencies of the mind. The result is a kind of
“modesty and reserve.”120
The other two varieties of skepticism Hume discusses are “antecedent to all study
and philosophy” and are meant to serve as “preservative[s] against error and precip-
itate judgment.”121 The first of these, which Hume associates with “Des Cartes,”
recommends an universal doubt, not only of all our former opinions and
principles, but also of our very faculties; of whose veracity, say they, we
must assure ourselves, by a chain of reasoning, deduced from some original
principle, which cannot possibly be fallacious or deceitful.122
According to Hume, such a skepticism would be a poor preparation for philosophy,
for it would leave us in perpetual suspension of judgment. By continually declining
to assent to any judgement until we have assured ourselves of the veracity of our
faculties, we effectively deprive ourselves of assenting to any “principle” which could
provide that assurance. As a result, “no reasoning could ever bring us to a state
of assurance and conviction upon any subject.”123 In the next paragraph, however,
118EHU 12.24, SBN 162
119EHU 12.24–25, SBN 161.
120EHU 12.24, SBN 161. Fogelin (2009), 6, cf. 158, also takes a balance between tendencies or
mechanisms of the mind to be central to mitigated skepticism: “When the destructive mechanisms
of Pyrrhonism—Hume’s label for radical skepticism—are counterbalanced by the mechanisms that
produce common (vulgar) belief, then the mind, as a result of the vector of these two opposing
forces, naturally settles into the standpoint of a mitigated or moderate skepticism.”
121EHU 12.3, SBN 149.
122EHU 12.3, SBN 149–50.
123EHU 12.3, SBN 150.
35
Hume acknowledges that the very same “species” of skepticism,
when more moderate, may be understood in a very reasonable sense, and
is a necessary preparative to the study of philosophy, by preserving a
proper impartiality in our judgments, and weaning our mind from all those
prejudices, which we may have imbibed from education or rash opinion.124
This “more moderate” variety still advises us “[t]o begin with clear and self-evident
principles.” But it does not demand that we show, through a chain of reasoning, that
such principles can never deceive. For a skeptic of this moderate sort, it is enough
to embody a degree of caution—“to advance by timorous and sure steps, to review
frequently our conclusions, and examine accurately all their consequences.”125 In
adopting antecedent skepticism, then, one develops a propensity to step back and
withhold any assent which is too quick and easy. This may involve checking the
steps of one’s reasoning, examining before judging, making sure one has not made a
mistake or imported a bias, and, when possible, looking for firmer foundations. But
the “Cartesian” variety takes this to excess. One who goes so far can never find a
foundation firm enough and so ends up in a continual search.
None of this is to deny that Hume sometimes uses the term ‘scepticism’ to refer
to a particular, historical, philosophical sect or tradition or its core principles. Hume
clearly uses the term this way at points. In the first Enquiry, for example, Hume seems
to regard skepticism as a body of “philosophical principles”126 that can be supported
by argument or reasoning: He says that skeptics give “profound arguments against the
senses”127 and “philosophical objection[s] to the evidence of sense,”128 and that they
124EHU 12.4, SBN 150, my emphasis.
125EHU 12.4, SBN 150.
126EHU 12.2, SBN 149; see also 12.21, SBN 158–59; 12.23, SBN 160.
127EHU 12.6, SBN 151.
128EHU 12.16, SBN 155.
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“attempt. . . to destroy reason by argument and ratiocination.”129 In the Treatise, he
speaks of “sceptics” as a “fantastic sect” that offers up “cavils” for their “opinions”
about the “uncertainty” of our judgments.130 At first, a conception of skepticism as
a temperament seems ill fit to accommodate these uses. A temperament is not a
“philosophical principle,” or body thereof, or a tradition or method. And though a
temperament could perhaps be adopted or inculcated as the result of reasoning, it
cannot itself be the conclusion of an argument.
But a temperament can be the source of the reasoning or tendency which leads
one to adopt a body of principles. Hume tells us as much when he claims that the
“decisions” and “pursuits” of “almost every” philosopher are dictated by his “predom-
inant inclination, to which his other desires and affections submit, and which governs
him, though, perhaps, with some intervals, through the whole course of his life.”131
In this way, a temperament can stand behind, shape, and lend character or content
to a body of principles. The “sceptical. . . system of philosophy” referred to in the
title of the fourth part of the Treatise’s first book can then be read as a collection of
arguments or principles that a person of a strongly inquisitive temperament would be
apt to make. Such a collection could include within it a long philosophical tradition
insofar as the tradition resulted from the same predominating temperament—one of
continual questioning, repeated applications of reason, and the doubt which follows on
their coattails. And Hume can call his philosophical exploration of the human under-
standing “sceptical” insofar as its repeated application of causal reasoning “tends to
129EHU 12.17, SBN 155.
130T 1.4.1.7–8, SBN 183.
131E Sc 1–2, Mil 159–60. See also EHU 5.1, SBN 40. Compare Nietzsche’s Gay Science, which
Nietzsche says is “written in the language of the wind that thaws ice and snow: high spirits, unrest,
contradiction, and April weather.” This “science” is an unruly collection of observations and pre-
scriptions which belong together insofar as they arise from a prevailing, albeit temporary, mood—
“the intoxication of convalescence” (Nietzsche 1974, 32). They form an “art. . . of cheerfulness,”
which betrays “a playful tenderness” (37).
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give us a notion of the imperfections and narrow limits of human understanding.”132
The idea that a philosophical sect or system can be characterized by a predom-
inating temperament can seem foreign. But in viewing the skeptical system in this
light, Hume in effect takes a more classical perspective on the character of philo-
sophical traditions. That perspective views them primarily in terms of competing
ways of living, and secondarily in terms of the arguments or principles which could
be used to justify those lived dispositions. In that light, the ‘skeptikos ’ is first and
foremost just what that word means: a person who ‘scopes out,’ observes, considers,
examines, or inquires.133 Though the historical sect may have, as a matter of fact,
been characterized by an excess in these activities, a more moderate kind is possible.
As we have seen, Hume characterizes skepticism both as a temperament and as
a doctrine, rather than only as a temperament. But the temperamental conception
appears to be primary. Hume uses the skeptical temperament to explain the appear-
ance of skeptical doctrines. And a preponderance of temperamental language reveals
a widespread emphasis on the temperamental conception. This conception finds tex-
tual support in Hume’s repeated invocation of the humors, his talk of skepticism
as a disposition, his emphasis on varying degrees of skepticism and on its modera-
tion or excess, and his association of skepticism with caution. These are not easily
accommodated by a conception of skepticism as a doctrine or theory.
The conception of skepticism as a temperament also allows us to resolve a puzzle
132A 27, SBN 657.
133Compare Livingston (1998), 7–11, which discusses the eudaemonistic sects and Hume’s self-
identification with skepticism. My reading of Hume’s skepticism perhaps invites a comparison with
Hellenistic skepticism, insofar as my reading privileges a notion of balance, which helps to combat
dogmatism and make one carefree. At first glance, this is reminiscent of Pyrrhonism. Pyrrhonians
thought that a certain philosophical method, which brought about a “balance” (isosthenia) between
diametrically opposed appearances, theories, or arguments, could counteract the tumults of dog-
matism, and bring about tranquility and quietude of the soul. But the comparison quickly breaks
down. The balance I find in Hume’s discussions of skepticism is not a feature of a philosophical
method—even if a recovery from excessive philosophy can help inculcate it. It is not a balance
between opposing theories, but between opposing temperaments.
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about skepticism’s role in Hume’s theory of human nature. For Hume seems to say
conflicting things. He calls skepticism a “malady,”134 and describes its unpleasant
symptoms in great detail. But he also treats it as an aid, prescribing “tinctures” of
it to “abate” certain ailments,135 and saying: “[i]n all incidents of life we ought still
to preserve our scepticism.”136 How can a single phenomenon, skepticism, be both
disease and medicine? The likening of skepticism to the melancholic temperament of
humoral theory offers an answer. A humor or temperament has varying degrees of
intensity; it can both dominate, destroying healthy psychic balance, and be moderate,
restoring or maintaining this balance. Hume can call skepticism a “malady,” because
it is harmful when it is overabundant and grips the mind with too much intensity.
And Hume can treat skepticism as a medicine: In appropriate doses, usually small, it
can temper excesses in the other humors or temperaments, and contribute its share
of the dispositions that together constitute a healthy mind.
Hume describes this function in the first Enquiry :
If any of the learned be inclined, from their natural temper, to haughti-
ness or obstinacy, a small tincture of Pyrrhonism might abate their pride,
by shewing them, that the few advantages, which they have attained over
their fellow, are but inconsiderable, if compared with the universal per-
plexity and confusion, which is inherent in human nature.137
Hume does not specify which humor or temperament characterizes the “natural tem-
per” he has in mind.138 But he comes closer in Treatise 1.4.7, where he describes
134T 1.4.2.57, SBN 218.
135EHU 12.24, SBN 161.
136T 1.4.7.11, SBN 270.
137EHU 12.24, SBN 161.
138In fact, Hume does not explicitly name any humors in his discussion of skepticism at the end of
the first Enquiry. Nonetheless, as we have seen, he still treats skepticism as a temperament which
may have various degrees of intensity. Moreover, humoral words and allusions do appear in his prior
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the kind of person who can benefit from skepticism as having a “warm imagination.”
Someone with a warm imagination, Hume says, dogmatically embraces philosophical
“hypotheses. . . merely for being specious and agreeable.”139 If uneducated, such a
person is prone to a kind of religious frenzy or raving which Hume calls ‘enthusiasm.’
For Hume, warmth of the imagination proceeds from “luxuriant health” and “a bold
and confident disposition”140—all of which are characteristic of the temperament as-
sociated with excessive blood. We can thus conclude that Hume attributes obstinacy
and dogmatism to excessive sanguinity. An overly sanguine temperament, he thinks,
can be treated by a brief experience of skeptical philosophy. A short glimpse of the
depressing state of our cognitive faculties can contribute the “degree of doubt, and
caution, and modesty, which, in all kinds of scrutiny and decision, ought for ever to
accompany a just reasoner.”141
Hume can then be read as offering the skeptical strands of his own philosophy
as the preferred melancholic tonic. Because such a tonic can treat other humoral
or temperamental excesses—especially the unbridled enthusiasm and dogmatism of
excessive blood or sanguinity—it belongs within our arsenal of cures as human beings
interested in living balanced, healthy lives.
This, I imagine, is Hume’s primary intention in considering skepticism in the
context of a recovery from melancholy described in humoral terms. He shows us not
only how to emerge from our own intellectual depression, but also how the experience
of that depression can be an education—how it can prepare us to cure ourselves and
others of other disorders or imbalances.
discussion of the role of philosophy in human life. There, he continues to associate “melancholy”
with excessive philosophy. And he continues to view a healthy life—one which “nature has pointed
out. . . as most suitable to the human race”—as including some philosophy, so long as it is “mixed”
with activities associated with the other temperaments, like socializing and rest (1.6, SBN 8–9).
139T 1.4.7.14, SBN 272.
140E SE 3, Mil 74.
141EHU 12.24, SBN 162.
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If the humoral reading of 1.4.7 is right, then the common interpretation that
Hume rejects a kind of skeptical theory in that section is distorting in two important
ways. According to that interpretation, what Hume rejects is a theory of human
knowledge on which we can know very little—presumably, a theory implied or inspired
by some of Hume’s findings earlier in the Treatise. In contemporary philosophy, the
word ‘skepticism’ often refers to just that: a negative or austere theory of human
knowledge adopted on philosophical grounds. It is “the view that we know nothing,
or that nothing is certain, or that everything is open to doubt,” or “that we know very
little or nothing of what we think we know.”142 But importing this sense of the word
into Hume’s thought can obscure the fact that he generally conceives of skepticism
at least largely as a temperament. After all, a theory is not a disease, or cure, or
disposition. Secondly, Hume does not exactly reject skepticism in 1.4.7, any more
than he simply accepts it. Rather, he tempers it. On his view, eradicating skepticism
would be unhealthy. Instead, he moderates skepticism, considered as a temperament,
by counterbalancing it with our other tendencies of thought and feeling.
6 Conclusion
At this point, we might wonder: What are Hume’s views about the substantive
doctrines associated with skepticism? What should we make of his arguments for or
against those doctrines? The humoral reading suggests a way to approach these ques-
tions. We can use humoral theory’s conception of health to help determine whether
142Stroud (1984), vii; Nozick (1981), 197, respectively. See also Comesaña and Klein (2019), §1:
“Philosophically interesting forms of skepticism claim that we do not know propositions which we
ordinarily think we do know.” Various recent interpreters of Hume attribute this theory conception
of skepticism to Hume, or else claim that Hume takes pains to reject it. Some of the clearer
examples come from the first camp. For example, Fogelin (1985), 6: “Hume accepts a theoretical
epistemological skepticism.” According to Meeker (1998), 34, cf. 32: “Hume’s system is sceptical in
the sense that it denies that humans have knowledge.”
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skeptical doctrines arise from a healthy state of mind. We can then ask whether Hume
draws a close connection between health and balance on the one hand, and truth and
justification on the other.143 If he does, considerations of health and balance would
play a crucial role in Hume’s views about what we should believe.
I have not attempted to address these further questions here. Instead, I have
offered a defense of the humoral reading, and have used it to reconceive Hume’s
skepticism and resolve two important puzzles. First, the humoral reading answers
our interpretive puzzle about the succession of the stages in 1.4.7. As I have argued,
Hume’s pervasive humoral vocabulary and imagery reveal that he views his recovery
from melancholy as a cycle through the four humors or temperaments, leading finally
to their balance. Second, the humoral reading helps to explain how Hume can see
skepticism as both a disease and a cure. It does so by encouraging us to see Hume
as viewing skepticism as a temperament, subject to both excess and moderation.
Why is this reading novel? Why have Hume’s humoral allusions gone mostly
unnoticed? The answer, I suspect, is this: Because humoral theory has long since
fallen from favor, contemporary readers are apt to view the allusions as mere artful
flourishes, rather than the terms of art they are. Michael Williams calls 1.4.7 “one
of the most dramatic expositions of skeptical doubt ever set down.”144 Ainslie goes a
step further, imagining it “must be the most literary stretch of writing in the English-
143These are central questions for debates about Hume’s naturalism. Both are already explored in
Kemp Smith (1941), who identifies certain mental tendencies as, on the one hand, “natural to the
mind,” “necessary for its proper functioning,” and conducive to “health and equilibrium” (493–99)
and, on the other, “adaptive” (76) or “reliable” (382). More recently, interpreters have suggested
an answer to the second question, by attributing to Hume a “proper functionalist” epistemology.
See Schmitt (1992), 69; Wolterstorff (1996), 166n6; Greenberg (2008), 728–29. Compare Schmitt
(2014), 360–75 and 362n32. For concerns see Meeker (2006). The humoral reading can help develop
such interpretations, by offering a rich conception of our ‘healthy’ or ‘natural’ condition—namely,
as involving a balance of the four classical temperaments. I leave a more detailed discussion of these
interpretations for another time.
144Williams (2004), 267.
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language philosophical canon.”145 While this praise may be deserved, I think it has
sometimes obscured the extent to which Hume’s choice of words and images in 1.4.7
serves not only his aesthetic ends, but also his philosophical ones. What can look like
lyricism or eighteenth century “charm” is in fact a substantive doctrine.
That doctrine is a conception of health as a balance of temperaments, each of
which contributes its share of dispositions to reason and believe in certain ways. The
melancholic, or skeptical, temperament contributes doubt, caution, and modesty to
our reasoning and inquiry. The sanguine temperament contributes hope and confi-
dence. The bilious and phlegmatic, though they receive less discussion, still plausibly
contribute resolve and equanimity, respectively.146 In excess, any of these dispositions
becomes pernicious: The melancholic grows into widespread doubt and madness; the
sanguine into hasty dogmatism and zealotry; the bilious into short-sightedness; and
the phlegmatic into dullness. But, when cooperating through mutual checks and bal-
ances, they produce a “just reasoner.”147 Sanguine confidence gets inquiry off the
ground, while melancholic caution keeps it from soaring too high. Even the “indo-
lence” of the phlegmatic temperament, Hume thinks, contributes a safeguard against
tarrying too long in abstruse reflection.148
The core of this conception is separable not only from humoral physiology, but
also from the humoral psychology of the four temperaments. Its basic idea is that
proper mental functioning involves a balance of tendencies to reason and believe in
certain ways, and that certain epistemic vices, such as skepticism and dogmatism,
are the extreme expression of the very same tendencies. These vices are then more a
145Ainslie (2015), 218. Ainslie does draw attention to melancholy. But his literary praise is a good
example of what I have in mind, and may make it easier for him to overlook the other humors. See
note 16.
146It is, after all, when Hume is bilious that he “resolve[s] never more to renounce the pleasures of
life for the sake of reasoning and philosophy” (1.4.7.10, SBN 269, my emphasis).
147EHU 12.24, SBN 162.
148EHU 1.12, SBN 12.
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matter of degree than of doctrine. As a result, even skeptics and dogmatists can lead
us toward proper mental functioning, when adopting some share of their dispositions
helps us correct our own imbalances. We do not need to accept humoral theory, or
even its psychological portion, in order to appreciate or accept this idea. Nonetheless,
it is an idea that Hume’s invocations of humoral theory can lead us to see for the first
time.
So is Hume, then, offering a kind of ‘virtue epistemology’? Hume’s use of humoral
theory suggests a way in which it is not misleading to say that Hume thinks of skep-
ticism in terms of virtue: a skeptical temperament, to the right degree, contributes to
excellence in reasoning and believing. But this is not the broadly pragmatic concep-
tion of virtue we find later in the Treatise, centered on the usefulness and agreeableness
of a character trait. It is, instead, the more typically Aristotelian picture of proper
functioning, and especially of balance, that plays the decisive role in Hume’s concep-
tion and treatment of skepticism.149 This balance is a mean with respect to various
dispositions, each of which tempers the others. It is in this context that skepticism
emerges for Hume as a stage, a temperament, a malady, and a cure.150
149Contra Schafer (2014), who reads 1.4.7 as “articulating a distinctively Humean account of epis-
temic virtue” which, “like Hume’s account of moral virtue” in the Treatise’s third book, “is rooted
in our passionate nature” (p. 4)—that is, in the passions we naturally feel in response to the utility
and agreeableness of character traits.
150I would like to thank Donald Ainslie, Bowen Chan, Jonathan Cottrell, Kathleen Creel, Sophie
Dandelet, Dominic Dimech, Stephen Engstrom, Vivian Feldblyum, Tyler Haddow, Jennifer Marušić,
Lisa Miracchi, John McDowell, Rhetta Morgan, Hsueh Qu, James Shaw, Yuan Wu, several editors
and referees at Ergo, members of the University of Pittsburgh graduate student community who
attended a Works-in-Progress Colloquium on this essay, and audiences at four 2018 conferences—
the Central Division Meeting of the American Philosophical Association, graduate conferences on
philosophy and psychology at Temple University and the University of Toronto, and “Galen and the
Early Moderns” at Università Ca’ Foscari, Venice—for their comments and support. A special thanks
to Colin Chamberlain, Eugene Chislenko, and Karl Schafer for their consistent insight, guidance,
and encouragement, which many times helped me emerge from my own philosophical melancholy
and get back to work. This essay is dedicated to the memory of Barry Stroud, whose writings,
temperament, and mentorship brought Hume to life for me.
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